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6. Financial Supervision Unification, Monetary Commitment and Central Bank 
Independence 
Each country has its degree of unification of powers with respect to financial 
supervision. The respective index reaches its maximum level in cases where there is a 
single authority and the minimum when there are more than three supervisors. The analysis 
conducted in the preceding pages claims that the degree of central bank involvement in 
supervision may condition the policymaker in his/her decision to alter the supervision 
concentration, according to an inverse relationship: the result is the central bank 
fragmentation effect. 
How do we econometrically test the robustness of the fragmentation effect? How can 
we evaluate the possible role of the monetary commitment or the influence of the central 
bank independence? In order to assess these relationships, we can estimate a model of the 
probability of different regime decisions as a function of these variables, controlling for 
other structural variables.  
The supervision regimes can be viewed as resulting from an unobserved variable: the 
optimal degree of financial supervision concentration, consistent with the policymaker 
utility. Each regime corresponds to a specific range of the optimal financial supervision 
concentration, with higher discrete FAC Index values corresponding to a higher range of 
financial concentration values. Since the FAC Index is a qualitative variable, the estimation 
of a model for such a dependent variable requires the use of a specific technique. 
Our qualitative dependent variable can be classified into more than two categories, 
given that the FAC Index is a multinomial variable. But the FAC Index is also an ordinal 
variable, given that it reflects a ranking. Then the ordered probit and ordered logit models 
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are appropriate estimators, given the ordered nature of the policymaker’s alternative; see 
Maddala (1983), Greene (1997), Wooldrige (2002). 
Let y be the policymaker’s ordered choices, taking the values (0,1,2,..,7). The ordered 
model for y, conditional on a set of K explanatory variables x, can be derived from a latent 
variable model (Equation 1). In order to test this relationship, let us assume that the 
unobserved variable vector, the optimal degree of financial supervision concentration y*, is 
determined by: 
y*=β’ x + ε     (1)  
where ε  is a random disturbance uncorrelated with the regressors, and β is a 1 x K 
regressors’ vector. 
The latent variable y* is unobserved. What is observed is the choice of each national 
policymaker to maintain or to reform the financial supervisory architecture: this choice is 
summarized in the value of the FAC Index, which represents the threshold values. For our 
dependent variable there are seven threshold values. Estimation is carried out by means of  
maximum likelihood techniques, assuming that ε is normally distributed across country 
observations, and the mean and variance of ε are normalized. This model can be estimated 
with an ordered Probit model or with an ordered Logit model4.  
Which economic model can be tested? First of all, given the recent empirical analyses 
(Masciandaro 2005 and  2006), the choice of the optimal level of financial supervision 
concentration could depend on the role of the central bank in the supervision architecture. 
                                                 
4 The Logit model differs from the Probit model only in the cumulative distribution function that is used to 
define choice probabilities. The maximum likelihood estimations were carried out by a packaged-ordered 
Probit and ordered Logit commands in STATA. To be complete we present both the Logit and the Probit 
results, given that, as usual, there is little basis for choosing between Probit and Logit models. 
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The expected sign of the relationship between central bank involvement and financial 
supervision consolidation is negative. 
Secondly, we can control for the potential role of the monetary commitment and the 
influence of the central bank independence. In fact, the central bank involvement variable 
may hide the role of the overall monetary commitment, that enforces the general reputation 
endowment of the central bank, or the influence of the central bank’s degree of 
independence, that strengthened its bureaucratic power. Therefore, both monetary 
institutional variables can capture the following effect: does monetary commitment and/or 
central bank independence matter in defining  the level of financial supervision 
consolidation, instead of the central bank involvement in supervision? The expected sign of 
the two relationships is negative.  
How can other control variables be chosen? Following Masciandaro (2005, 2006) we 
shall test the more general hypotheses: 
First, the policymaker chooses to maintain or reform the degree of supervisory 
concentration in response to the structure of the financial system. In the modern debate on 
financial structure, it is usual to compare the equity dominance model (or market-based 
regime) with the bank dominance model (or bank-based regime). Furthermore, recent 
literature pointed out the close relationship between the financial structure model and the 
corporate governance model in every country, with particular attention to the relative 
political determinants; see Pagano and Volpin (2000), Perotti and Von Thadden (2003). 
Therefore, the control variables must capture the following effect: does the financial 
structure model (financial factor) matter in defining the policymaker’s choices in the area 
of supervisory consolidation?  
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The expected sign of the relationship between the degree of supervision unification and 
the financial factor is undetermined (i.e. it can be either positive or negative). In section 
two we stressed the importance of the blurring process for banking and financial markets 
worldwide. In a bank-based regime, if we think that the policymakers’ choices depend on 
the features of their own regime, we can suppose a positive relationship between the kind 
of regime and the degree of financial supervision consolidation, exactly in face of the 
financial conglomerates effect. The rationale for the creation of a single financial 
supervisory authority is the blurring of confines between banks, insurers and financial 
service providers. The increasing importance of financial conglomerates requires the 
unification of supervisory functions. At the same time, however, the blurring effect also 
means potential changes in the nature and dimensions of the financial markets (the 
securitisation effect). Therefore, in a market-based regime we can also expect a positive 
relationship between the kind of regime and the degree of financial supervision 
consolidation, this time in the face of the securitisation effect. Therefore the relationship 
between the financial factor and the degree of supervision concentration remains an 
empirical question. 
Second, the political and institutional environment can determine the ability of the 
policymakers to implement their choices. Furthermore, we pointed out that the financial 
structure itself could be influenced by political factors. Then the control variables must 
capture a possible second relevant effect: does the quality of public governance (political 
factor) matter in defining the policymaker’s choices on the level of supervisory 
concentration? The expected sign of the relationship between the degree of supervision 
unification and the political factor is also undetermined. In section two we noted that, 
whatever the financial regime of his/her country, a policymaker may choose a higher 
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degree of supervision in order to improve the capacity to face the challenges of the blurring 
process. Then we can suppose a positive relationship between good governance indicators 
and supervision unification. But a policymaker may prefer a single authority in order to 
increase the probability of capturing the financial supervisory structure. Therefore, at the 
same time we might expect a positive relationship between bad governance indicators and 
supervision consolidation. Again, the relationship between the political factor and the 
degree of supervision concentration remains an empirical question. 
However, we must note that the relationship between the degree of supervision 
consolidation and the characteristics of the banking and financial markets might “obscure” 
the importance of other variables, which are themselves determinants in explaining the 
characteristics of the banking and financial markets; for example, in Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Laeven and Levine (2003) regulation becomes non-significant in explaining banking 
performance when checking for institutional indicators. Recently, the structure of financial 
markets was explained with three different institutional approaches (legal factors): the 
“legal approach” - La Porta et al. (1998) - the “economic approach” - Rajan and Zingales 
(2000) - the “political economy approach” - Pagano and Volpin (2000), Perotti and von 
Thadden (2003). Then we have to include control variables related to the legal-financial 
view and the endowment view, while the political-financial view was already represented 
by the indicator of governance. 
Finally, as the above descriptive analysis pointed out, the concentration of powers 
seems more peculiar of developed countries, particularly in the European context. 
Moreover, we asked ourselves whether the choices of policymakers to increase the degree 
of consolidation of supervisory powers might depend on the level of development in their 
respective countries (economic factor). Furthermore, the geographical factor might also be 
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important, in terms of location in Europe. Then we could expect a positive relationship 
between European location and OECD membership, as well as the levels of economic 
growth, on one hand, and financial supervision concentration, on the other.  
The general specification is represented by equation (2):  
 
 
 
 
 
 
with country 481K=i . 
 
The independent variables are the following5: 
  
1. CBFA Index is the index of involvement of the central bank in supervision, defined in section four; 
 2. MCB Index is a monetary institutional variable: we use first the MOC Index (monetary commitment), 
then the CBI Index (central bank independence); both variables were defined in section five; 
3. CBFAMCB factor is the composite effect of CBFA Index and MCB Index; 
4. MvB Index = Market vs Bank Index: binary variable for the private governance factor. It is a dummy 
that expresses the financial system of a given country, market-based (1) versus bank-based 6 (0); 
5. mcap = Market capitalization/GDP: quantitative variable for the private governance factor.  It shows a 
measure of the securities market size, relative to GDP7;  
                                                 
5  The correlation matrix for the variables is in Table 2. 
6   The index is calculated using different banking and financial variables: see Demigüç-Kunt and Levine 
(1999). For each variable we calculate the mean of four time values: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002.   
7  World Bank, 2003, World Development Indicators, Stock Markets 5.3. For each variable we calculate the 
mean of four time values: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002. Note that the correlation index between the financial 
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6. goodgov = Good Governance: quantitative variable for the public governance factor. It shows the 
structural capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies. Furthermore the index can 
represent the control variable for the politics and finance view8;  
6.  gdp = Gross Domestic Product: quantitative  variable for the economic size factor9;  
7. OECD = binary variable for the economic factor. It is a dummy that signals whether a given country is a 
member of the OECD (1) or not (0); 
8. Europe = binary variable for the geographical factor. It is a dummy that signals whether a given country 
is European (1) or not (0); 
9-11. AnglosaxonL, FrenchL, GermanScandL = binary variables for the law factor. They are dummies 
that indicate the legal root of a given country, representing the control variables for the law and finance view10; 
12. Latitude = quantitative variable for the endowment view. The variable is calculated as the absolute 
value of the latitude of the country, scaled to take values between 0 and 1 11. 
 
In the multinomial ordered models the impact of a change in an explanatory variable on 
the estimated probabilities of the highest and lowest of the order classifications - in our case 
the Single Authority model and the “pure” Multi-supervisory model - is unequivocal: if βj is 
                                                                                                                                                        
regime variable (MvB) and the market capitalization variable (mcap) is high, but their influence on the 
dependent variable is very low. 
8  The index is built using all the indicators proposed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003). They 
define (public) governance as the exercise of authority through formal and informal traditions and 
institutions for the common good, thus encompassing: 1) the process of selecting, monitoring and replacing 
governments; 2) the capacity to formulate and implement sound policies and deliver public services; 3) the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
them. Furthermore, for measurement and analysis purposes, these three dimensions of governance can be 
further unbundled to comprise two measurable concepts per each of the dimensions above for a total of six 
components: 1) voice and external accountability; 2) political stability and lack of violence; 3) government 
effectiveness; 4) lack of regulatory burden; 5) rule of law; 6) control of corruption. The authors present a 
set of estimates of these six dimensions of governance for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000,2002. For 
every country, therefore, we first calculate the mean of the four time values for each dimension of 
governance; then we build up an index of global good governance in the period 1996-2002, calculating the 
mean of the six different dimensions. 
9  World Bank, 2003, World Development Indicators. For each variable we calculate the mean of four time 
values: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002. 
10  Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001). The legal roots are five: Anglo-Saxon Law (=Common Law), 
French, German and Scandinavian Laws (=Civil Laws), Socialist Law (Others) ; we skip one root – 
choosing the Socialist Laws, as the least significant from an economic point of view – to avoid 
multicollinearity problems. 
11  La Porta et al. (1999). On the endowment view, also see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001). 
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positive, for example, an increase in the value of xj increases the probability of having the 
Single Authority model, while it decreases the probability of having the “pure” Multi-
supervisory model. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the Logit and Probit estimates of the general specification, using the 
sample of 48 countries12. The result of all the estimates confirm the robustness of the role of 
the central bank involvement, and also the monetary commitment (Table 2) and the central 
bank independence (Table 3) are inversely related to the supervision consolidation. The 
monetary institutional indexes do not substitute the central bank involvement effect, but they 
also influence the supervision unification. Therefore, both the central bank’s role as 
supervisor and its monetary legal status matter in explaining the supervisory architectures. 
However the two factors – central bank involvement and central bank monetary status – are 
independent; the composite factor is never significant (Table 2 and 3). 
Another possible proxy of the reputation endowment effect and/or the bureaucracy effect 
could be the age of the central bank. We employ an index of central bank age (CBAGE 
Index) utilizing the information provided on the central bank web sites. For each central 
bank the value of the index is simply equal to the years between the central bank 
establishment and today. If a relationship between age and reputation and/or bureaucratic 
power holds, the higher CBAGE Index, the higher the reputation endowment and/or the 
specific bureaucratic power of the central bank.  
Table 4 shows the Logit and Probit estimates of the general specification with the new 
variable – CBAGE Index – using the same sample. The central bank age does not matter: the 
                                                 
12  The country sample depends on the availability of institutional data. Given the 267 world countries (UN 
members are 180), our 48 countries represent 54 percent of world GDP and 30 percent of the world 
population.  
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probability of a more consolidated supervision is not linked with the age of the monetary 
authorities.  
Finally, it is crucial to test the robustness of the hypothesis that the central bank 
involvement can be considered an independent variable, rejecting any reverse causality. In 
other words, we had to reject the hypothesis that central bank involvement is endogenous, 
i.e. that the policymaker jointly determines the financial supervision level and the central 
bank involvement, based on the same explicative model. We then considered central bank 
involvement as dependant variable (Table 5). Our conclusion is that the variables that could 
explain the degree of central bank involvement in financial supervision do not coincide with 
those that we use to analyse the degree of consolidation. In fact, if one performs Logit and 
Probit regressions using CBFA as dependent variable and the same vector of financial and 
institutional variables, the results are not significant at all.  
Furthermore, to test the robustness of the institutional factor, we tried changing the index 
of central bank involvement, making it perfectly symmetrical with the index of financial 
supervision level13 (Table 6). As expected, all the results are confirmed.  
Finally, looking at the control variables, the probability that a country will move 
towards a Single Authority model is higher: 1)  the  smaller the overall size of the economy; 
2) the higher the goodness of public governance; 3) when the jurisdiction adopt the Civil 
Law, particularly if the legal framework is characterized by German and Scandinavian 
roots14. 
                                                 
13  The different levels of central bank involvement can be measured using the identical scale of the FAC 
Index (labelled CBFA Two Index): 1 = the central bank has responsibility in no sector; 3 = the central bank 
has responsibility in one sector; 5 = the central bank has responsibility in two sectors; 7 = the central bank 
has responsibility in all three sectors. 
14  We contrast the empirical results of Masciandaro (2005), who claimed that - given a different sample  of 
countries (68) – also the financial variables are significant. In Masciandaro (2006) – with a data set of 89 
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First of all, the choice of the degree of supervisory unification is influenced by the 
dimension of the economic systems. More specifically, the lower the overall economic size, 
the more likely it seems that the probability of consolidation will increase, confirming the 
hypothesis of policymakers conditioned by the “small country” situation15.  The small country 
effect captures the fact that with relatively few people the expertise in financial supervision is 
likely to be in short supply, and then this expertise might be more effectively utilized if it is 
concentrated with a single financial agency.  
Secondly, the legal factor matters. This law effect is puzzling.  The law and finance 
literature claims the existence of a strong relationship between market oriented financial 
systems and the British law jurisdictions. Here, we do not find that financial supervision 
unification is directly correlated with a market-based regime, while a link exists with the Civil 
Law root, in particular with the German and Scandinavian legal systems. This suggests a sort 
of “legal neighbour” effect.  
Thirdly, the choice of policymakers to establish the concentration of supervisory 
powers could be facilitated by an institutional environment characterized by good governance. 
The relationship between good governance and the supervision concentration process can be 
explained, if we suppose that a policymaker who cares about soundness and efficiency would 
prefer the single financial authority as the optimal one in the face of the blurring challenges. 
 
7. Conclusions 
                                                                                                                                                        
countries – the good governance coefficient is weakly significant. Therefore, the financial and political 
factors seem to be sample sensitive explanatory variables. 
15  It has been noted that the small country effect holds. Notwithstanding, we do not include in our sample the 
eight very small countries (Bahrain, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Maldives, Netherlands Antilles, 
Singapore and United Arab Emirates) that introduce the unified  financial authorities. 
